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Abstract
An integrated approach to truth-gaps and epistemic uncertainty is described, based
on probability distributions defined over a set of three-valued truth models. This com-
bines the explicit representation of borderline cases with both semantic and stochastic
uncertainty, in order to define measures of subjective belief in vague propositions.
Within this framework we investigate bridges between probability theory and fuzzi-
ness in a propositional logic setting. In particular, when the underlying truth model
is from Kleene’s three-valued logic then we provide a complete characterisation of
compositional min-max fuzzy truth degrees. For classical and supervaluationist truth
models we find partial bridges, with min and max combination rules only recoverable
on a fragment of the language. Across all of these different types of truth valuations,
min-max operators are resultant in those case in which there is only uncertainty about
the relative sharpness or vagueness of the interpretation of the language.
Keywords Vagueness, Truth-gaps, Probability, Fuzziness.
1 Introduction
From its inception fuzzy logic has largely been seen as a direct competitor to probability
as a theory of uncertainty. This perceived conflict has motivated several vigorous critiques
of fuzzy theory by Bayesian statisticians including Lindley [35], Cheeseman [2], [3] and,
Laviolette and Seaman [26], amongst others. As particularly emphasised by Cooke [6], a
central theme of many of these critiques is that of operational semantics. Consider, for
example, a witness to a robbery describing the suspect to a police officer. If she says that
‘the suspect is short’ with fuzzy truth degree 0.6, then what does she mean? What exactly
can the police officer infer from the value 0.6? The benchmark in this context is generally
taken to be the work of de Finetti [7] who, inspired by the operationalism movement in
physics, proposed betting behaviour as an operational semantics for subjective probability
(See Paris [40] for an exposition). It is certainly the case that de Finetti’s results lend
weight to the claim that probability is the optimal calculus for measures of uncertainty,
1
since agents adopting any other type of measure would be subject to Dutch books 1. In
other words, to quote Lindley [35], we would seem to be forced to concede that ‘the only
satisfactory description of uncertainty is probability’.
Yet this argument is not quite as compelling as it might at first seem. Although widely
accepted, de Finetti’s betting model does make certain assumptions which are open to
question. For example, in the formulation it is assumed that the buying and selling prices
of a bet are the same. However, Walley [52] introduces a more general framework of
coherent gambles which does not make such an assumption and naturally results in lower
and upper probabilities as measures of subjective belief. Furthermore, Paris [41] observes
that bets are inherently defined relative to an underlying truth-model. In the case of
a Tarskian (or classical) truth-model then to avoid Dutch books the resulting measure
of subjective belief must be a probability measure on the set of sentences of the relevant
language i.e. on those sentences about which bets are offered. In addition, this turns out to
be equivalent to defining a probability distribution on the set of possible truth-valuations
of the language, and then taking the belief value of a sentence to be the probability of
those valuations for which it is true. Indeed, Paris [41] has shown that if, more generally,
the outcome of bets are dependent on a truth-valuation selected from a set of binary
functions B, then the avoidance of Dutch bets requires that belief measures be similarly
defined in terms of probability distributions over B. However, depending on the nature
of these binary functions B, then the resulting measure may not be a probability measure
over the sentences of the language. This latter point is important since it will allow us to
give a probabilistic interpretation to the fully truth-functional min-max calculus of fuzzy
logic, with an associated betting semantics, but where probabilities are defined over a set
of non-Tarskian truth-models.
We claim that non-Tarskian truth-valuations are particularly relevant when we allow
vague propositions into our language. To make this case we must first identify some impor-
tant characteristics of vagueness in natural language. Both Lindley [35] and Cheeseman
[3] argue that quantifying subjective belief in vague propositions such as ‘the suspect is
short’ presents no significant difficulty to probability theory. More specifically, Cheeseman
[3] proposes that vagueness should be understood as uncertainty concerning the under-
lying interpretation of the language, e.g. uncertainty about what is the exact definition
of short, and consequently is probabilistic in nature. The idea that uncertainty about
meaning should be explicitly quantified is clearly an important and rather neglected one.
To a great extent language is learned empirically through interactions with others and the
environment, as well as through exposure to social media such as the written word. Con-
sequently, the association of words and meanings, is not only naturally dynamic but also
an emergent phenomenon. There is no central authority or oracle to interrogate about the
1willingly accepting a sequence of bets which are sure to result in an overall loss, irrespective of the
true state of the world
correct boundaries of vague categories. Instead, individual agents only have data about
how others have used these categories in similar contexts. Subjective uncertainty must
surely then be inherent to any such complex system.
Lawry and Tang [31] refer to uncertainty about meaning as semantic uncertainty and
contrast it with stochastic uncertainty which refers to uncertainty about the state of the
world. For example, in order for our robbery witness to assess her level of belief in the
proposition ‘the suspect is short’, she would need to take into account both her stochastic
uncertainty about the height of the suspect, and her semantic uncertainty about the loca-
tion of the height boundary that divides short from not short. We argue in Lawry [27] that
semantic uncertainty is effectively epistemic in nature and can be treated probabilistically.
This viewpoint is broadly in keeping with that of Lassiter [25] and consistent with both
the random set theory and likelihood interpretations of fuzzy membership functions as
described in [11]. Now if we accept that the underlying truth-model should be Tarskian
even for vague propositions, then this epistemic view of semantic uncertainty brings us
close to Williamson’s epistemic theory of vagueness [54]. In this paper, however, we will
argue that there is more to vagueness than only semantic uncertainty and therefore that
a more flexible truth theory may be appropriate when evaluating vague propositions.
Vagueness is a multifaceted phenomenon. For instance, Keefe and Smith [22] identify
‘three interrelated features’ of vague predicates; 1) borderline cases 2) lack of well-defined
extensions or boundaries, and 3) susceptibility to sorites paradoxes. Arguably 2) relates to
semantic uncertainty as outlined above and is amenable to probabilistic treatment. The
sorites paradoxes in 3) concern sequences of indistinguishable elements where the first
element in the sequence belongs to a certain class and the last to its negation. A classical
model then requires drawing an arbitrary boundary between the class and its negation
which by necessity then allocates indistinguishable elements to opposite classes. We will
not address this aspect of vagueness in this current paper except to the extent that is
related to and influenced by features 1) and 2), and we would point interested readers
towards the extensive literature on the topic, an excellent overview of which is given in
Williamson [54]. Instead, we aim to describe and justify a model of subjective belief for
vague propositions in which feature 1) plays a central role. More specifically, we will
assume a three-valued truth model in which borderline cases naturally occur as a result
of vague predicates being only partially (or incompletely) defined.
In the sequel we propose an integrated approach to truth-gaps and epistemic uncer-
tainty based on probability distributions defined over a finite set of three-valued truth
models for a propositional language. This will combine the explicit representation of bor-
derline cases with a quantification of both semantic and stochastic uncertainty, so as to
define measures of subjective belief over the sentences of a language containing vague
propositions. As well as suggesting a general framework for the treatment of both vague-
ness and uncertainty, this approach will provide an number of bridges, in the sense of
[10], between probability theory and fuzzy logic, including a complete characterisation of
truth-functional min-max fuzzy logic [55]. Given the broad scope of both subjects our
bridges are by necessity narrow ones. For example, we have as yet made no attempt to
investigate the wide variety of truth-functional calculi developed by fuzzy logicians [19].
Instead, the proposed bridges will only be with Zadeh’s original min-max calculus [55].
Despite this limitation we would argue that the proposed probabilistic semantics for fuzzy
logics goes some way to answering the interpretational questions posed in [2], [3] [6], [26]
and [35] .
An outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces valuation pairs as a generic
three-valued truth model and then focuses on Kleene’s three-valued logic as a particular
case. Section 3 describes the lower and upper measures of subjective belief which naturally
result from defining probability distributions over Kleene valuation pairs. In section 4 we
propose a notion of truth degree as the mid-point of the lower and upper measures defined
in section 3. Furthermore, we show that truth degrees defined in this way, characterise min-
max fuzzy truth degrees in the case when uncertainty only concerns the level of vagueness
of the underlying interpretation of the language. In section 5 we outline a betting semantics
for truth degrees exploiting Paris’ [41] generalization of de Finetti’s famous result. We
then extend our proposed framework to other truth models and, in particular, in section
6 we investigate bridges between fuzzy logic and probabilities defined over both Tarski
(classical) and supervaluationist truth models. Finally, section 7 presents some discussion
and conclusions. Overall, the work presented builds on and exploits the general framework
for subject belief in the presence of vagueness described in [29], [30], [31], [32] and [33].
2 Truth-Gaps in a Propositional Language
In the literature two main approaches to modelling truth-gaps have been proposed; three-
valued logic [23] and supervaluationism [16]. Here we will introduce a generic form of truth
valuation for propositional languages which is sufficiently flexible to allow us to represent
both these types of models in their simplest form. This will enable us to study both
approaches using the same basic notation, thus making it easier to identify and discuss
relationships and differences between them. We also claim that the proposed notion of
valuation pair is an intuitive way to represent truth-gaps, which when combined with
probability, naturally leads to lower and upper subjective belief measures on the sentences
of the language.
Let L be a language of propositional logic with connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬ and propo-
sitional variables P = {p1, . . . , pn}. Let SL denote the sentences of L as generated re-
cursively from the propositional variables by application of the three connectives, and let
LL = P ∪ {¬p : p ∈ P} denote the literals of L. A valuation pair on SL then consists
of two binary functions v and v representing lower and upper truth values. The underly-
ing idea is that v represents the strong criterion of absolutely true while v represents the
weaker criteria of not absolutely false.
Definition 1. Valuation Pairs
A valuation pair is a pair of functions ~v = (v, v) where v : SL → {0, 1} and v : SL →
{0, 1} such that v ≤ v. Furthermore, ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, if v(θ) = v(θ) = α and v(ϕ) = v(ϕ) = β
then v(¬θ) = v(¬θ) = 1− α, v(θ ∧ ϕ) = v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(α, β) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = v(θ ∨ ϕ) =
max(α, β).
Notice that we can also think of a valuation pair as a three-valued mapping with
~v(θ) having possible values t = (1, 1), b = (0, 1) and f = (0, 0), standing for absolutely
true, borderline and absolutely false respectively. We will use this three-valued notation
interchangeably with the lower and upper valuation notation throughout this paper. The
second part of definition 1 is motivated by the intuition that if we restrict ourselves to
the non-vague (crisp) sentences of L then valuation pairs should have the same properties
as classical valuations. Indeed, classical valuations can be viewed as a special case of
valuation pairs where for every sentence θ ∈ SL, v(θ) = v(θ), i.e. as valuations for which
the truth value b does not occur.
In accordance with [39], we might think of a sentence being absolutely true as meaning
that it can be uncontroversially asserted without any risk of censure, while being not
absolutely false only means that it is acceptable to assert i.e. one can get away with such
an assertion. Recall, our example of a witness describing the suspect as being short. If
she was to testify to this in a court of law then depending on the actual height of the
suspect her statement may be deemed as clearly true or clearly false, in which latter case
the witness could be accused of perjury. However, there will also be an intermediate height
range for which, while there may be doubt and differing opinions concerning the use of
the description short, it would not be deemed as definitely inappropriate and hence the
witness would not be viewed as committing perjury. In other words, for certain height
values of the suspect, it may be acceptable to assert the statement p=‘the suspect is short’,
even though this statement would not be viewed as being absolutely true. One possible
model of the predicate short exhibiting such truth-gaps could be as follows: Let h be
the height of the suspect and suppose that short is defined in terms of lower and upper
thresholds h ≤ h on heights. We might also think of this as a partial interpretation of
the predicate short generated as an abstraction from independent consideration of certain
clearly positive and clearly negative examples. In this case p is absolutely true if h ≤ h,
absolutely false if h > h and borderline if h < h ≤ h (see figure 1).
It is important to note that in this model truth-gaps corresponding to different lower
and upper truth valuations are not the result of epistemic uncertainty concerning the
state of the world, but are rather due to inherent flexibility in the underlying language
conventions. In other words, a truth-gap (or middle truth value in three-valued logic) does
Figure 1: An interpretation of the predicate short incorporating a truth-gap.
not represent an uncertain epistemic state [5]. For example, given absolute certainty about
the suspect’s height h, the proposition p may then be known to be borderline because of
the inherent flexibility (or vagueness) in the definition of the concept short i.e. because
h < h ≤ h. The potential confusion resulting from applying many-valued logic to model
epistemic uncertainty is highlighted by Dubois in [12]. Here we emphasize the truth-value
status of the intermediate case by the use of the term borderline rather than ‘uncertain’
or ‘unknown’ as originally suggested by Kleene [23].
Initially, we will focus on valuation pairs which capture Kleene’s three-valued logic
[23], and then return in section 6 to investigate supervaluations within this framework.
Definition 2. Kleene Valuation Pairs
A Kleene valuation pair on L is a valuation pair ~v = (v, v) where ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL the following
hold:
• v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ) and v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ)
• v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ))
• v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
Let Vk denote the set of all Kleene valuation pairs on L.
From definition 2 we can generate truth tables for the connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬ in terms
of the truth values {t,b, f} identical to those of Kleene’s logic [23] (see table 1)2.
¬
t f
b b
f t
∧ t b f
t t b f
b b b f
f f f f
∨ t b f
t t t t
b t b b
f t b f
Table 1: Truth tables from Kleene’s strong three-valued logic.
Kleene’s logic has been proposed as an appropriate formalism for truth gaps by a
number of authors including Shapiro [45], Soames [47] and Tye [49]. In some respects
it is a rather conservative calculus which tends to allocate borderline status to sentences
more readily than, say, a supervaluation approach. In particular, it permits borderline
2Recall that in valuation pair notation t = (1, 1), b = (0, 1) and f = (0, 0).
contradictions (and tautologies), since from table 1 we can see that ~v(θ ∧ ¬θ) = b (~v(θ ∨
¬θ) = b) exactly when ~v(θ) = b. Such a feature is contentious, with some arguing that a
contradiction θ ∧ ¬θ should always be deemed absolutely false, irrespective of the truth-
value of θ. For instance, as we shall see in section 6, supervaluations preserve all classical
contradictions, tautologies and equivalences. However, since we are modelling truth values
rather than epistemic states [5], the validity or otherwise of borderline contradictions is
rather unclear. This is because truth models simply represent conventions governing how
the underlying language is interpreted, and as such they have the status of primitives. In
particular, for the propositional language L the properties we choose for valuation pairs
effectively codify our understanding of the connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬, in a three valued
context. We could of course ask which type of valuation provides the best model of
vagueness in natural language. This question remains firmly open, due to the fact that
there have been very few empirical studies directly addressing issues such as borderline
contradictions. One such study, described by Ripley [43], involves an experiment in which
the participants are asked to state their level of agreement with contradictions of the
form ‘the circle is near the square and it isn’t near the square’, when presented with a
sequence of images, in which a circle and square are shown at various distances from each
other along a line. Whilst the results are somewhat inconclusive Ripley does find evidence
to suggest an increased willingness amongst the participants to accept contradictions in
borderline cases.
2.1 A Positive and Negative Characterisation of Kleene Valuations
In this sub-section we consider a characterisation of Kleene valuation pairs in terms of pos-
itive and negative propositions as represented by the sets of absolutely true propositional
variables and absolutely true negated propositional variables respectively. More formally,
a Kleene valuation pair ~v can be characterised by an orthopair3 (P,N) ∈ 2P × 2P where
P = {pi ∈ P : v(pi) = 1} and N = {pi ∈ P : v(¬pi) = 1}. Notice, that from definition 2 it
holds immediately that P ∩N = ∅. The next result shows how the value of ~v across SL
can be determined directly from its associated orthopairs (P,N). The following mapping
between sentences of L and sets of pairs, forms the basis of our proposed characterisation.
Definition 3. λ-mapping
Let λ : SL → 22
P×2P be defined recursively as follows: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL
• λ(pi) = {(F,G) ∈ 2
P × 2P : pi ∈ F}
• λ(θ ∧ ϕ) = λ(θ) ∩ λ(ϕ)
• λ(θ ∨ ϕ) = λ(θ) ∪ λ(ϕ)
3An orthopair is simply a pair of sets (F,G) such that F ∩G = ∅ [4].
• λ(¬θ) = {(Gc, F c) : (F,G) ∈ λ(θ)}c
Notice that the λ-mapping in definition 3 is not restricted solely to orthopairs but
also includes pairs of sets of propositional variables with non-empty intersection. As
described in [29], such sets characterize a more general class of binary function pairs (v1, v2)
which satisfy the duality and min-max combination rules of definition 2 but without the
requirement that v1 ≤ v2
4. This class of function pairs clearly includes Kleene valuation
pairs as a special case. Consequently, many of the results in [29] carry across to the current
context including the following characterization theorem.
Theorem 4. [29] For a Kleene valuation pair ~v ∈ Vk characterised by orthopair (P,N)
it holds that ∀θ ∈ SL, v(θ) = 1 if and only if (P,N) ∈ λ(θ) and v(θ) = 1 if and only if
(P,N) ∈ λ(¬θ)c.
Example 5. Let pi, pj ∈ P then
λ(pi) = {(F,G) : pi ∈ F}, λ(¬pj) = {(F,G) : pj ∈ G} and λ(pi ∧ ¬pj) = {(F,G) : pi ∈
F, pj ∈ G}. Hence, v(pi) = 1 iff pi ∈ P and v(pi) = 1 iff pi 6∈ N . Similarly, v(¬pj) = 1 iff
pj ∈ N and v(¬pj) = 1 iff pj 6∈ P . Furthermore, v(pi ∧ ¬pj) = 1 iff pi ∈ P and pj ∈ N ,
and v(pi ∧ ¬pj) = 1 iff pi 6∈ N and pj 6∈ P .
2.2 Semantic Precision: A Vagueness Ordering on Valuation Pairs
We now define semantic precision as a natural partial ordering on valuation pairs. This
concerns the situation in which one valuation pairs admits more borderline cases than
another but where otherwise their truth values agree. More formally, valuation pair ~v1 is
less semantically precise than ~v2, denoted ~v1  ~v2, if they disagree only for some set of
sentences of L, which being identified as either absolutely true or absolutely false by ~v2,
are classified as being borderline cases by ~v1. In other words, ~v1 is less semantically precise
than ~v2 if all of the absolutely true and absolutely false valuations of ~v1 are preserved by
~v2. Hence, one might think of  as ordering valuation pairs according to their relative
vagueness. Shapiro [45] proposed essentially the same ordering of interpretations which
he refers to as sharpening i.e. ~v1  ~v2 means that ~v2 extends or sharpens ~v1.
Definition 6. Semantic Precision
~v1  ~v2 if and only if ∀θ ∈ SL, v1(θ) ≤ v2(θ) and v1(θ) ≥ v2(θ)
5.
Theorem 7. [29] ∀~v1, ~v2 ∈ Vk, where ~v1 and ~v2 are characterised by orthopairs (P1, N1)
and (P2, N2) respectively, it holds that; ~v1  ~v2 if and only if P1 ⊆ P2 and N1 ⊆ N2.
4We are referring here to the more general class of pairs of functions (v1, v2) where v1 : SL → {0, 1},
v2 : SL → {0, 1} and ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, v1(¬θ) = 1 − v2(θ), v2(¬θ) = 1 − v1(θ), v1(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v1(θ), v1(ϕ)),
v2(θ∧ϕ) = min(v2(θ), v2(ϕ)), v1(θ∨ϕ) = max(v1(θ), v1(ϕ)) and v2(θ∨ϕ) = max(v2(θ), v2(ϕ)), but where
it is not required that v1 ≤ v2. In this case (v1, v2) can take four values corresponding to t = (1, 1),
b = (0, 1), i = (1, 0) and f = (0, 0). The truth tables for these four truth values are then those of Belnap’s
four-valued logic [1].
5Alternatively, using three-valued notation ~v1  ~v2 if and only if ∀θ ∈ SL, ~v1(θ) = t ⇒ ~v2(θ) = t
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Figure 2: A sequence of valuation pairs ~v1  ~v2  ~v3 as characterised by increasingly
vague interpretations of the predicates short and young.
Figure 2 shows three valuation pairs relevant to the crime reporting example described
in section 1, each based on different interpretations of the predicates short and young. Here
we now have two propositions corresponding to p1 =‘the suspect is short’ and p2 =‘the
suspect is young’. The predicates short and young are defined by lower and upper thresh-
olds on height and age respectively, thus identifying clear t, b and f intervals for each
predicate, as indicated in figure 2. The height h and age y of the suspect are then shown
as being constant across the three valuations. Working down the three interpretations
the definitions of both predicates become increasingly vague in the sense that the size of
each borderline interval is increasing. In orthopair notation the three valuation pairs are
~v1 = (∅, ∅), ~v2 = (∅, {p2}) and ~v3 = ({p1}, {p2}) respectively. As such they satisfy the
nestedness condition of theorem 7 and hence, ~v1  ~v2  ~v3.
3 Probability in the Context of a Three-Valued Truth Model
Within the proposed three-valued framework, we take the view that uncertainty concerning
the sentences of L effectively corresponds to uncertainty as to which is the correct valuation
pair for L. A betting argument in favour of this assumption is explored in section 5. As
discussed in the introduction, we propose a probabilistic treatment of both semantic and
stochastic uncertainty in the context of an underlying three-valued truth model. For
example, consider the three-valued interpretation of the predicate short as shown in figure
1. In this case semantic uncertainty manifests itself in terms of uncertainty about the exact
values of the thresholds h and h, whilst stochastic uncertainty would be about the suspect’s
height h. Treating both types of uncertainty as being epistemic in nature, and defining
a joint probability distribution over h, h and h, together with other similar variables
arising in relation to other vague predicates, would then naturally result in a probability
distribution over the valuation pairs of L. This integrated treatment of both semantic
and stochastic uncertainty is also consistent with the ideas of Lassiter [25] who proposes
a joint probability distribution over states of the world and language interpretations, and
then outlines a treatment of Sorites based on this approach.
Viewing semantic uncertainty as being epistemic in nature requires that agents make
the assumption that there is a correct underlying interpretation of the language L, but
about which they may be uncertain. This is a weaker version of the epistemic theory of
vagueness as expounded by Timothy Williamson [54] and which we refer to as the epis-
temic stance [27]. Williamson’s theory assumes that for a vague predicate there is a precise
but unknown boundary between it and its negation. In contrast the epistemic stance cor-
responds to the more pragmatic view that individuals, when faced with decision problems
about what to assert, find it useful as part of a decision making strategy to simply assume
that there is an underlying correct interpretation of L. In other words, when deciding
what to assert agents behave as if the epistemic theory is correct. Another difference
between the epistemic theory and our current approach is that the former assumes that
the underlying truth model is classical, while here we assume a three-valued model which
can exhibit truth-gaps.
In the following definition we assume that uncertainty is quantified by a probability
measure w on the set of Kleene valuation pairs Vk of L.
Definition 8. Kleene Belief Pairs [29]
Let w be a probability distribution defined on Vk so that w(~v) is the agent’s subjective
belief that ~v is the true valuation pair for L. Then ~µ = (µ, µ) is a Kleene belief pair where
∀θ ∈ SL,
µ(θ) = w({~v : v(θ) = 1}) and µ(θ) = w({~v : v(θ) = 1})
Alternatively,
µ(θ) = w({~v : ~v(θ) = t}) and µ(θ) = w({~v : ~v(θ) 6= f})
Note that here and in the sequel we abuse notation slightly and use the same symbol w to
stand for both a probability distribution on Vk and the probability measure on 2
Vk which
it then induces.
In this formulation it also trivially holds that:
w({~v : ~v(θ) = f}) = µ(¬θ) and w({~v : ~v(θ) = b}) = µ(θ)− µ(θ)
The following theorem highlights a number of properties of Kleene belief pairs, includ-
ing additivity. This latter property in particular, distinguishes Kleene belief pairs from
Dempster-Shafer belief and plausibility measures [44] on SL which are not, in general,
additive.
Theorem 9. For all θ, ϕ ∈ SL, the following hold [33], [53]:
• µ(θ) ≤ µ(θ)
• µ(¬θ) = 1− µ(θ) and µ(¬θ) = 1− µ(θ).
• µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = µ(θ) + µ(ϕ)− µ(θ ∧ ϕ) and µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = µ(θ) + µ(ϕ)− µ(θ ∧ ϕ)
4 Truth Degrees as Mid-Points
We now introduce an additional type of uncertainty measure on SL arising from the
definition of a probability distribution on Vk, which we will refer to as truth degrees. These
are defined as the mid-point, or average, of the lower and upper Kleine belief measures
given in definition 8.
Definition 10. Truth Degrees
Let (µ, µ) be a Kleene belief pair on L as given in definition 8, then the corresponding
truth degree td : SL → [0, 1] is defined as the mid-point of µ and µ so that ∀θ ∈ SL;
td(θ) =
µ(θ) + µ(θ)
2
Notice that by definitions 8 and 10, td(θ) corresponds to sum of the probability that
~v(θ) = t and a half of the probability that ~v(θ) = b;
td(θ) = w({~v : ~v(θ) = t}) +
w({~v : ~v(θ) = b})
2
and
td(¬θ) = w({~v : ~v(θ) = f}) +
w({~v : ~v(θ) = b})
2
In other words, td(θ) is determined by reallocating the probability of b evenly between t
and f . Also, notice that by theorem 9 truth degrees satisfy the following two properties:
∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL,
• td(¬θ) = 1− td(θ)
• td(θ ∨ ϕ) = td(θ) + td(ϕ)− td(θ ∧ ϕ)
These properties are also satisfied by probability measures on SL (see Paris [40] for an
exposition), but unlike probability, truth degrees do not always give values 0 and 1 to
classical contradictions and tautologies 6. In fact, it holds that:
td(θ ∧ ¬θ) =
w({~v : ~v(θ ∧ ¬θ) = b})
2
=
w({~v : ~v(θ) = b})
2
=
µ(θ)− µ(θ)
2
Hence, if the agent has non-zero belief that θ is a borderline sentence, i.e. µ(θ) > µ(θ),
then they will allocate non-zero truth degree to θ∧¬θ, with an upper bound of 0.5 if they
6It is also the case that truth degree do not necessarily give the same value to classically equivalent
sentences, but only to sentences which are equivalent in Kleene’s logic
are certain of the borderline status of θ. Similarly, if the agent is certain that θ is t, i.e.
µ(θ) = µ(θ) = 1, then td(θ) = 1, whilst if they are certain that θ is f , i.e. µ(θ) = µ(θ) = 0,
then td(θ) = 0. Hence, truth degree values of 0, 12 and 1 all correspond to states of total
epistemic certainty.
It should be noted that we are somewhat reluctant to use the term truth degree for
the mid-point measure in definition 10. In fact, our main motivation for doing so is to
emphasise a link with fuzzy logic [55], the details of which we will describe below. However,
to a certain extent the term is inappropriate since from definition 10 we can see that truth
degrees are subjective measures of belief defined in the context of a three-valued truth
model, and not truth values on a [0, 1] scale, as in the case of infinite valued logics [19].
This status as subjective belief will be made even more apparent when we consider a
betting semantics for truth degrees in section 5.
Kleene belief pairs and truth degrees have been independently proposed by Williams
[53] using a different but equivalent notation. Given a Kleene valuation, Williams proposes
three distinct loadings in the form of binary and tertiary mappings defined on SL; these
are Kleene loading corresponding to v, LP loading corresponding to v and symmetric
loading corresponding to v+v2
7. Assuming a probability distribution on Vk, [53] defines
three measures on SL by taking the expected value of the different loadings across Vk,
these then corresponding to µ, µ and td respectively. In the light of this correspondence,
[53] also states a version of theorem 9.
We now introduce fuzzy truth degrees as corresponding to a fully truth-functional
(compositional) measure on SL, with the same min-max combination rules as were orig-
inally proposed by Zadeh [55] for fuzzy membership functions. We will then show that
fuzzy truth degrees are a special case of mid-point truth degrees as given in definition 10,
but where the agent’s only uncertainty concerns the correct level of vagueness (semantic
precision) appropriate for the interpretation of L.
Definition 11. Fuzzy Truth Degree
A fuzzy truth degree on L is a function ζ : SL → [0, 1] satisfying ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL:
• ζ(¬θ) = 1− ζ(θ)
• ζ(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(ζ(θ), ζ(ϕ))
• ζ(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(ζ(θ), ζ(ϕ))
Theorem 12. Let w be a probability distribution on Vk such that {~v : w(~v) > 0} =
{~v1, . . . , ~vm} where ~v1  . . .  ~vm and let (µ, µ) be the associated Kleene belief pair on L.
Also, let td : SL → [0, 1] be the truth-degree generated from (µ, µ) according to definition
10. Then in this case td is a fuzzy truth degree on L as given in definition 11.
7LP stands for ‘logic of paradox’ and symmetric refers to symmetric logic (see Priest [42] for an
overview).
Proof. We define binary functions bi : SL → {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , 2m such that: ∀θ ∈ SL
bi(θ) =
{
vi(θ) : i ≤ m
v2m+1−i(θ) : i > m
Now since ~v1  . . .  ~vm it follows that b1 ≤ b2 ≤ . . . ≤ b2m. Also, if we define ∀θ ∈ SL,
iθ = min{i : bi(θ) = 1} then {bi : bi(θ) = 1} = {bi : i ≥ iθ}
8. We now define a probability
distribution w′ on {b1, . . . , b2m} according to:
w′(bi) =
{
w(~vi)
2 : i ≤ m
w(~v2m+1−i)
2 : i > m
From this we have that:
td(θ) =
w({~v : v(θ) = 1})
2
+
w({~v : v(θ) = 1})
2
= w′(bi : i ≤ m, bi(θ) = 1) + w
′(bi : i > m, bi(θ) = 1)
= w′(bi : bi(θ) = 1) =
2m∑
i=iθ
w′(bi)
Now for θ, ϕ ∈ SL we consider the following cases:
• td(¬θ): As already noted above, it follows trivially from definition 10 and theorem
9 that td(¬θ) = 1− td(θ).
• td(θ ∧ ϕ): By definition 2 we have that ∀i, bi(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(bi(θ), bi(ϕ)), hence
iθ∧ϕ = min{i : bi(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1} = min{i : min(bi(θ), bi(ϕ)) = 1} = min{i : bi(θ) =
1 and bi(ϕ) = 1} = max(min{i : bi(θ) = 1},min{i : bi(ϕ) = 1}) = max(iθ, iϕ).
Therefore,
td(θ ∧ ϕ) =
2m∑
i=iθ∧ϕ
w′(bi) =
2m∑
i=max(iθ,iϕ)
w′(bi)
= min(
2m∑
i=iθ
w′(bi),
2m∑
i=iϕ
w′(bi)) = min(td(θ), td(ϕ))
• td(θ ∨ ϕ): By definition 2 we have that ∀i, bi(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(bi(θ), bi(ϕ)), hence
iθ∨ϕ = min(iθ, iϕ). Therefore,
td(θ ∨ ϕ) =
2m∑
i=iθ∨ϕ
w′(bi) =
2m∑
i=min(iθ,iϕ)
w′(bi)
= max(
2m∑
i=iθ
w′(bi),
2m∑
i=iϕ
w′(bi)) = max(td(θ), td(ϕ))
8In the case that {bi : bi(θ) = 1} = ∅ then for notational convenience we take, iθ = 2m+1. Subsequently,
we then apply the convention that if j > 2m then
∑2m
i=j w
′(bi) = 0
Theorem 13. Let td : SL → [0, 1] be a fuzzy truth degree on L generated as in theorem
12. Then ∀θ ∈ SL;
µ(θ) = max(0, 2td(θ)− 1) and µ(θ) = min(1, 2td(θ))
Proof. For θ ∈ SL we consider the following two cases:
• td(θ) ≤ 12 : Now notice that by definition of w
′ it holds that w′({bm+1, . . . , b2m}) =
1
2 .
Hence, since td(θ) ≤ 12 then it follows that iθ ≥ m+ 1. Therefore;
µ(θ) = w({~v : v(θ) = 1}) = 2w′({bi : i > m, bi(θ) = 1})
= 2w′({bi : bi(θ) = 1}) since iθ ≥ m+ 1 = 2td(θ)
• td(θ) > 12 : In this case iθ ≤ m by the above argument. From this it follows that:
bi(θ) = 1,∀i > m⇒ vi(θ) = 1 for i = 1, . . . ,m⇒ µ(θ) = 1
Hence, ∀θ ∈ SL, µ(θ) = min(1, 2td(θ)) as required. Then by duality:
µ(θ) = 1− µ(¬θ) = 1−min(1, 2td(¬θ)) = 1−min(1, 2(1− td(θ)))
= max(0, 2td(θ)− 1)
The following corollary first appeared as a theorem in Lawry and Gonzalez [29], where
it has a more direct proof. It is natural to include it here, however, as a consequence of
theorems 12 and 13. As already noted elsewhere, e.g. in [29] and [31], it provides a clear
bridge between Kleene belief pairs and interval-valued fuzzy logic [56].
Corollary 14. Let w be a probability distribution on Vk such that {~v : w(~v) > 0} =
{~v1, . . . , ~vm} where ~v1  . . .  ~vm and let (µ, µ) be the associated Kleene belief pair on L.
Then ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL;
µ(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µ(θ), µ(ϕ)), µ(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µ(θ), µ(ϕ)) and
µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µ(θ), µ(ϕ)), µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µ(θ), µ(ϕ))
Proof. By theorems 12 and 13 we have that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL;
µ(θ ∧ ϕ) = max(0, 2td(θ ∧ ϕ)− 1) = max(0, 2min(td(θ), td(ϕ))− 1)
= min(max(0, 2td(θ)− 1),max(0, 2td(ϕ)− 1)) = min(µ(θ), µ(ϕ))
The remaining cases then follow similarly.
In the context of theorem 12 we can, in fact, now say something stronger about the
relationship between Kleene belief measures and min-max fuzzy logic. Not only is it
true that a special case of mid-point truth degrees (definition 10) are fuzzy truth degrees
(definition 11), but also as we will show below, mid-point truth degrees which have w
non-zero only on a sequence of increasingly sharp valuations, actually provide a complete
characterisation of compositional fuzzy truth degrees.
Lemma 15. Let ζ : SL → [0, 1] be a fuzzy truth degree, as given in definition 11, and
let w be a probability distribution on Vk such that {~v : w(~v) > 0} = {~v1, . . . , ~vm} where
~v1  . . .  ~vm. Then ∀θ ∈ SL, ζ(θ) = td(θ) if and only if ∀l ∈ LL (i.e. for all literals of
L), µ(l) = max(0, 2ζ(l)− 1).
Proof. (⇒) if ∀θ ∈ SL, td(θ) = ζ(θ) then it follows trivially that ∀l ∈ LL, µ(l) =
max(0, 2ζ(l)− 1) by theorem 13.
(⇐) ∀p ∈ P we consider two cases:
1) ζ(p) 6= 12 : In this case, then by definition 11 either ζ(p) >
1
2 or ζ(¬p) >
1
2 . Let
l ∈ {p,¬p} be such that ζ(l) > 12 . Now µ(l) = max(0, 2ζ(l) − 1) = 2ζ(l) − 1 > 0.
Also, by theorem 13 µ(l) = max(0, 2td(l)− 1). Hence, max(0, 2td(l)− 1) = 2ζ(l)− 1
⇒ 2td(l) − 1 = 2ζ(l) − 1 ⇒ td(l) = ζ(l) ⇒ td(¬l) = ζ(¬l) by definition 11 and the
general properties of mid-point truth degrees as described in the first part of this
section. Hence, td(p) = ζ(p) and td(¬p) = ζ(¬p).
2) ζ(p) = ζ(¬p) = 12 : In this case µ(p) = max(0, 2ζ(p) − 1) = 0. Also, by theorem
13 we have that µ(p) = max(0, 2td(p) − 1). Therefore, max(0, 2td(p) − 1) = 0 ⇒
td(p) ≤ 12 . Similarly, µ(¬p) = max(0, 2ζ(¬p) − 1) = 0 and by theorem 13 we have
that µ(¬p) = max(0, 2td(¬p)−1). Therefore, max(0, 2td(¬p)−1) = 0⇒ td(¬p) ≤ 12 .
Hence, since td(¬p) = 1− td(p) it follows immediately that td(p) = td(¬p) = 12 .
From this argument we have that ∀l ∈ LL, td(l) = ζ(l). Hence, given the truth-
functionality of both td and ζ following from theorem 12 and definition 11 respectively,
we have that ∀θ ∈ SL, td(θ) = ζ(θ), as required.
Theorem 16. For any fuzzy truth degree ζ : SL → [0, 1] on L, as given in definition
11, there is a unique sequence ~v1  . . .  ~vm of Kleene valuation pairs on L and an
associated probability distribution w on Vk for which {~v : w(~v) > 0} = {~v1, . . . , ~vm}, such
that ∀θ ∈ SL;
ζ(θ) = td(θ) =
µ(θ) + µ(θ)
2
Proof. Using the orthopair notation for valuation pairs, then given any pair (P,N) we can
naturally generate a set of literals F = P ∪ {¬p : p ∈ N}. Since (P,N) is an orthopair
so that P ∩N = ∅, it immediately follows that ∀p ∈ P, {p,¬p} 6⊆ F . Furthermore, given
only F we can identify (P,N) by taking P = {p : p ∈ F} and N = {p : ¬p ∈ F}. Hence,
the set F = {F ⊆ LL : ∀p ∈ P, {p,¬p} 6⊆ F} of subsets of literals, provides an alternative
characterisation of the set of orthopairs and consequently, by theorem 4, of Vk. Also, note
that by theorem 4, it follows that ∀l ∈ LL, v(l) = 1 if and only if l ∈ F .
By the above argument and theorem 7 it follows that any probability distribution w
satisfying the required properties (i.e non-zero only on a sequence of valuations totally
ordered by ) is characterised by a nested sequence of subsets of literals {Fi : i} such
that Fi ∈ F and Fi ⊆ Fi+1, together with weights wi ∈ [0, 1] for which
∑
iwi = 1. More
specifically, Fi is a characterisation of valuation pair ~vi and wi = w(~vi). Furthermore,
given such a characterisation, we have that ∀l ∈ LL;
µ(l) =
∑
Fi:l∈Fi
wi
Notice that a sequence of this form together with an associated set of weights defines a
consonant (or nested) random set on F and, by the above equation, µ : LL → [0, 1] is
then the corresponding single point coverage function.
Now let {l : ζ(l) > 12} = {l1, . . . , lm−1} ordered such that ζ(li−1) ≥ ζ(li) for i =
2, . . . ,m− 1. Since ζ(l) > 12 ⇒ ζ(¬l) <
1
2 it follows that the set {l1, . . . , lm−1} ∈ F as are
all its subsets. Given the above characterisation and lemma 15 it follows that the result
holds if and only if there exists a nested sequence {Fi : i} where Fi ⊆ Fi+1 ⊆ {l1, . . . , lm−1}
with associated weights wi where
∑
iwi = 1 and for which∑
Fi:lj∈Fi
wi = 2ζ(lj)− 1 for j = 1, . . . ,m− 1
Now from a well-known result according to which a consonant random set can be recovered
from its single point coverage function (see theorem 2 in [18] or alternatively [24] and [8]
for a more straightforward treatment of the finite case), it follows that the above set of
equations has a solution given by:
Fm = {l1, . . . , lm−1}, . . . , Fi = {l1, . . . , li−1}, . . . , F2 = {l1}, F1 = ∅
and
wm = 2ζ(lm)− 1, . . . , wi = (2ζ(li−1)− 1)− (2ζ(li)− 1) = 2(ζ(li−1)− ζ(li))
, . . . , w1 = 1− (2ζ(l1)− 1) = 2(1− ζ(l1))
Furthermore, this solution is known to be unique once terms where wi = 0 are removed.
The corresponding orthopairs representation can then be recovered as outlined above.9
9It is possible that wi = 0 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. For example, this could occur if ζ(li) = ζ(li−1)
or if ζ(l1) = 1. In this case, the resulting distribution w will be such that the length of the sequence of
valuation pairs for which w(~v) > 0 will be strictly less that m (rather than equal to m). However, since in
the statement of the theorem m is simply a variable taking integer values greater than or equal to 1, then
this does not effect the result.
The proof of theorem 16 includes an algorithm for determining w and ~v1  . . .  ~vm
given fuzzy truth degree values on the propositional variables of L. This algorithm is now
illustrated in the following example.
Example 17. Let L have propositional variables P = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6}. Let ζ be a
fuzzy truth-degree on L for which:
ζ(p1) = 0.6, ζ(p2) = 0.7, ζ(p3) = 0.85, ζ(p4) = 0.1, ζ(p5) = 0.2, ζ(p6) = 0.35
Now considering those literals l for which ζ(l) > 12 we have:
ζ(p1) = 0.6, ζ(p2) = 0.7, ζ(p3) = 0.85, ζ(¬p4) = 0.9, ζ(¬p5) = 0.8, ζ(¬p6) = 0.65
Resulting in the ordering:
ζ(¬p4) > ζ(p3) > ζ(¬p5) > ζ(p2) > ζ(¬p6) > ζ(p1)
This gives us the following sequence of orthopairs with associated probabilities:
F7 = {¬p4, p3,¬p5, p2,¬p6, p1} 7→ (P7, N7) = ({p3, p2, p1}, {p4, p5, p6}) : w7 = 2(0.6)− 1 = 0.2
F6 = {¬p4, p3,¬p5, p2,¬p6} 7→ (P6, N6) = ({p3, p2}, {p4, p5, p6}) : w6 = 2(0.65− 0.6) = 0.1
F5 = {¬p4, p3,¬p5, p2} 7→ (P5, N5) = ({p3, p2}, {p4, p5}) : w5 = 2(0.7− 0.65) = 0.1
F4 = {¬p4, p3,¬p5} 7→ (P4, N4) = ({p3}, {p4, p5}) : w4 = 2(0.8− 0.7) = 0.2
F3 = {¬p4, p3} 7→ (P3, N3) = ({p3}, {p4}) : w3 = 2(0.85− 0.8) = 0.1
F2 = {¬p4} 7→ (P2, N2) = (∅, {p4}) : w2 = 2(0.9− 0.85) = 0.1
F1 = ∅ 7→ (P1, N1) = (∅, ∅) : w1 = 2(1− 0.9) = 0.2
Notice that (P7, N7) corresponds to a classical valuation since N7 = P
c
7 , whilst (P1, N1)
corresponds to a fully vague model in which all sentences are borderline cases.
The general relationship between fuzzy truth degrees and the probabilities of t, b and
f can be summarised as shown in figure 3. More specifically, the probability of each of the
three truth values is a (piecewise) linear function of fuzzy truth degree as follows10:
• For td(θ) ≤ 12 : In this case w({~v : ~v(θ) = t}) = 0, w({~v : ~v(θ) = b}) = 2td(θ), and
w({~v : ~v(θ) = f}) = 1− 2td(θ)
• For td(θ) > 12 : In this case w({~v : ~v(θ) = t}) = 2td(θ) − 1, w({~v : ~v(θ) = b}) =
2(1− td(θ)) and w({~v : ~v(θ) = f}) = 0
10Given theorems 12 and 16 showing that fuzzy truth degrees are a special case of mid-point truth
degrees, we will from now on also use the notation td when discussing the former.
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Figure 3: Plot showing the relationship between the fuzzy truth degree td(θ) and the
probabilities w({~v : ~v(θ) = f}) (denoted w(θ; f)), w({~v : ~v(θ) = b}) (denoted w(θ;b)) and
w({~v : ~v(θ) = t}) (denoted w(θ; t))
In other words, if td(θ) ∈ (0, 0.5) then it is certain that θ is not absolutely true, but
uncertain whether θ is borderline or absolutely false. Similarly, if td(θ) ∈ (0.5, 1) then it is
certain that θ is not absolutely false, but uncertain whether θ is borderline or absolutely
true. Given this we can begin to address issues like that of the police officer wondering
what she can infer from a witness asserting that ‘the suspect is short’ with truth degree
0.6. We now see from figure 3 that such an assertion can be interpreted as the witness
believing the suspect to be absolutely short with probability 0.2, and borderline short with
probability 0.8.
5 A Betting Semantics for Truth Degrees
In this section we discuss a possible betting semantics for Kleene belief pairs and truth
degrees taking as the point of departure de Finetti’s operational semantics for subjective
probability [7]. By way of background we first give an overview of Paris’ generalization
of de Finetti’s framework and state the main result from [41]. We will then exploit this
result when considering bets under a three-valued truth model.
Let B be a finite set of binary functions from SL into {0, 1} representing the set of
possible truth states. In de Finetti’s original formulation B was the set of Tarski valuations
on L. However, in Paris’ generalization it is not restricted in this way. A bet on sentence
θ ∈ SL, requiring stake s ∈ R, and with odds α ∈ [0, 1], denoted by (s, α, θ), is then
defined as follows:
• pay s× α pounds.
• if b(θ) = 1 then receive s pounds.
• if b(θ) = 0 then receive 0 pounds.
where b ∈ B corresponds to the true state of the world. Notice that we permit s < 0
which is interpreted as the agent selling rather than buying the bet. Now suppose an
agent accepts a set of bets (si, αi, θi) for i = 1, . . . , t, then her overall gain will be:
t∑
i=1
si(b(θi)− αi)
Furthermore, this set of bets is referred to as a Dutch book if the above expression is
negative for every function b ∈ B. In other words, a Dutch book is a set of bets which, if
accepted, would result in a sure loss no matter what the true state of the world turns out
to be.
We now define an agent’s subjective belief in a sentence θ, denoted B(θ), to be the
odds for which she will accept the bet (s,B(θ), θ) for any stake s ∈ R. In the light of this
definition Paris [41] proves the following result:
Theorem 18. There is no Dutch book acceptable to an agent adopting belief measure B,
if and only if there exists a probability distribution w on B such that ∀θ ∈ SL;
B(θ) = w({b : b(θ) = 1})
Notice that if B is the set of Tarski valuations on L then theorem 18 means that in
order to avoid Dutch bets, B must be a probability measure on SL.
Having set the scene we can now return to consider bets assuming an underlying
three-valued truth model. In order to adapt the generalized de Finetti approach to this
context we must decide how to deal with borderline outcomes. In otherwords, how is
the bet (s, α, θ) decided if the truth value of θ is b? One approach would be to agree
that the agent only wins s if θ is absolutely true and wins 0 otherwise. These type of
bets, termed lower bets, are discussed in detail in Lawry and Tang [31]. Notice that by
taking B = {v : ~v ∈ Vk} and applying theorem 18, it follows that in order for an agent
to avoid Dutch books consisting of lower bets then she must adopt Kleene lower belief
measures on SL as her measures of subjective belief. There is then also a dual notion of
upper bets in which a win occurs if and only if θ is not absolutely false. This time taking
B = {v : ~v ∈ Vk}, theorem 18 then forces a rational agent to adopt Kleene upper belief
measures.
In order to provide a betting interpretation of truth degrees we now propose an alter-
native approach to dealing with borderline outcomes, which we will refer to as decider bets.
The essential idea behind these bets is that winning or loosing in the case of a borderline
outcome is determined on the basis of the truth-value of some fixed and inherently crisp
proposition q ∈ P i.e. this being the decider. In other words, a bet (s, α, θ) now takes the
following form:
• Pay s× α pounds.
• If ~v(θ) = t then receive s pounds.
• If ~v(θ) = f then receive 0 pounds.
• If ~v(θ) = b then,
– if ~v(q) = t then receive s pounds, else
– if ~v(q) = f then receive 0 pounds.
where ~v ∈ Vk(q) and Vk(q) = {~v ∈ Vk : ~v(q) 6= b} is the set of all possible truth states .
Decider bets can then be reformulated in terms of a certain class of binary functions
B defined as follows: ∀~v ∈ Vk(q), let b~v : SL → {0, 1} be such that ∀θ ∈ SL;
b~v(θ) =
{
1 : ~v(θ) = t or (~v(θ) = b and ~v(q) = t)
0 : otherwise
Alternatively, taking v(q) = v(q) = v(q) then:
b~v(θ) = max(v(θ),min(v(θ), v(q)))
We then take:
B = {b~v : ~v ∈ Vk(q)}
Hence, the true state of the world generates a particular element b ∈ B and we can then
reformulate the decider bets so that they now fit within Paris’s formulation. Consequently,
a rational agent must define her belief measure B in terms of a probability distribution w
on this particular set of binary functions B as given in theorem 18. The following result
now shows that each valuation pair in Vk(q) identifies a unique element of B.
Theorem 19. For ~v1, ~v2 ∈ Vk(q) if ~v1 6= ~v2 then b~v1 6= b~v2
Proof. Notice that b~v(q) = v(q) and hence we need only consider the case where ~v1(q) =
~v2(q) since otherwise the result follows trivially i.e. by taking θ = q.
Suppose that ~v1(q) = ~v2(q) = t and w.l.o.g consider the following cases: ∃θ ∈ SL such
that
• ~v1(θ) = t and ~v2(θ) = f : In this case b~v1(θ) = 1 and b~v2(θ) = 0. Hence, b~v1 6= b~v2 .
• ~v1(θ) = f and ~v2(θ) = b: In this case b~v1(θ) = 0 and b~v2(θ) = 1. Hence, b~v1 6= b~v2 .
• ~v1(θ) = t and ~v2(θ) = b: Notice in this case that b~v1(θ) = b~v2(θ) = 1. However,
by duality ~v1(¬θ) = f and ~v2(¬θ) = b and hence from above b~v1(¬θ) = 0 and
b~v2(¬θ) = 1. Therefore, b~v1 6= b~v2 .
Further suppose that ~v1(q) = ~v2(q) = f and w.l.o.g consider the following cases: ∃θ ∈ SL
such that
• ~v1(θ) = t and ~v2(θ) = f : In this case b~v1(θ) = 1 and b~v2(θ) = 0. Hence, b~v1 6= b~v2 .
• ~v1(θ) = t and ~v2(θ) = b: In this case b~v1(θ) = 1 and b~v2(θ) = 0. Hence, b~v1 6= b~v2 .
• ~v1(θ) = f and ~v2(θ) = b: Notice in this case that b~v1(θ) = b~v2(θ) = 0. However,
by duality ~v1(¬θ) = t and ~v2(¬θ) = b and hence from above b~v1(¬θ) = 1 and
b~v2(¬θ) = 0. Therefore, b~v1 6= b~v2 .
From theorem 19 we see that w on B naturally generates a probability distribution
on Vk(q), also denoted w, such that w(~v) = w(b~v). Hence, for the agent to avoid Dutch
books consisting of decider bets, B must satisfy that for all θ ∈ SL;
B(θ) = w({b~v : b~v(θ) = 1}) = w({~v : b~v(θ) = 1})
= w({~v : ~v(θ) = t}) + w({~v : ~v(θ) = b, ~v(q) = t})
Now for B(θ) to correspond to a truth degree value of θ as given by definition 10 requires
that;
w({~v : ~v(θ) = b, ~v(q) = t}) = w({~v : ~v(θ) = b, ~v(q) = f}) =
w({~v : ~v(θ) = b})
2
One scenario in which this assumption could be valid is as follows: Let L′ denote L
restricted to the propositional variables P −{q}, and SL′ be the sentences of L′. Then we
assume that q is chosen so as to be independent of the sentences in SL′ and furthermore,
such that the agent’s belief in q being true is 12 . By independent, we mean that for any
sentence θ ∈ SL′ the truth value of q, i.e. ~v(q), is independent of the truth value of θ, i.e.
~v(θ). Hence, we are assuming that w on Vk(q) satisfies the following: ∀θ ∈ SL
′
w(~v(q)|~v(θ)) = w(~v(q)) and w(~v(q) = t) = w(~v(q) = f) =
1
2
For example, q might refer to the outcome from tossing a certain fair coin as being a head,
whilst P − {q} could be propositions referring to characteristics of the next person, call
them x, to walk through a door e.g. x is tall, x is handsome, x is blonde etc.
Example 20. Let L be such that P = {p1, p2, p3, p4, q} and let Vk(q) be the set of all
Kleene valuation pairs on L for which ~v(q) 6= b. Let w be the probability distribution on
Vk(q) defined in orthopairs notation as follows:
({p1, q}, ∅) : 0.1, ({p1}, {q}) : 0.1, ({p1, p2, q}, ∅) : 0.15, ({p1, p2}, {q}) : 0.15,
({p1, p2, q}, {p3}) : 0.2, ({p1, p2}, {p3, q}) : 0.2,
({p1, p2, q}, {p3, p4}) : 0.05, ({p1, p2}, {p3, p4, q}) : 0.05
In this case all of the above conditions are satisfied. For example, consider θ = p2 ∧¬p3 ∈
SL′, then the following holds:
w(~v(q) = t|~v(p2 ∧ ¬p3) = b) = w(~v(q) = f |~v(p2 ∧ ¬p3) = b) =
1
2
= w(~v(q) = t)
To see this notice that the only valuation pairs with non-zero probability for which ~v(p2 ∧
¬p3) = b are the following;
({p1, q}, ∅), ({p1}, {q}), ({p1, p2, q}, ∅), ({p1, p2}, {q})
Amongst this subset of valuations the probability is then split evenly between those for
which ~v(q) = t and those for which ~v(q) = f . Furthermore, notice that if we restrict
ourselves to sentences in SL′ then the corresponding marginal distribution for valuation
pairs on L′ is as follows:
({p1}, ∅) : 0.2, ({p1, p2}, ∅) : 0.3, ({p1, p2}, {p3}) : 0.4, ({p1, p2}, {p3, p4}) : 0.1
Furthermore, note that the above valuation pairs with non-zero probability form a nested
sequence as required in theorem 7 and hence the truth degree generated by w according to
definition 10, corresponds to a fuzzy truth degree (definition 11) when restricted to SL′.
6 Truth Degrees in a Classical or Supervaluation Frame-
work
As discussed in section 2 Kleene valuations pairs are only one of several possible models
to account of truth-gaps in a propositional language. Furthermore, the fact that, amongst
other features, they permit borderline contradictions, makes them controversial. Indeed,
we might also view such a liberal allocation of borderline status in the light of a more
general failure to represent penumbral connections. Fine [16] introduced the notion of
penumbral connections as corresponding to ‘logical relations [that] holds between indef-
inite sentences’. As can be seen from table 1 the Kleene three-valued truth tables are
conservative, in that both the conjunction and the disjunction of two borderline sentences
are always also borderline cases. This property ultimately means that many penumbral
connections simply cannot be captured within the Kleene framework. On the other hand,
as discussed in [31], supervaluations are better able to represent absolute relationships be-
tween borderline sentences. In particular, θ∧¬θ is always absolutely false in the superval-
uationist model irrespective of the truth value of θ. As noted in section 2, supervaluations
on a propositional language can also be expressed within the valuation pair notation. In
subsection 6.2 we will investigate supervaluation pairs together with their associated belief
pairs and truth degrees, and describe their relationships to min-max fuzzy logic.
Before discussing supervaluations we will initially, in subsection 6.1, investigate fuzzi-
ness when assuming a purely classical (Tarskian) truth model. This is consistent with
Lindley’s [35] and Cheeseman’s [3] claims that vagueness can be captured entirely within
classical probability theory. From the perspective of the earlier discussion in section 1, in
this case we will be equating vagueness with semantic uncertainty and denying the exis-
tence of explicit borderline cases. Instead, a borderline case of a predicate will simply be
interpreted as one in which the probability of the predicate and its negation holding are
both close to 0.5. In fact, the assumption of an underlying classical truth model is common
to many of the proposed probabilistic semantics for fuzziness including [20], [27], [37], [46]
and [48]. Here we will show that under certain circumstances the classical probabilistic
version of truth degrees, i.e. probability measures on SL, can be consistent with fuzzy
truth degrees but only on a restricted subset of the sentences of L.
6.1 Truth Degrees and Sequences of Tarski Valuations
Let Vc denote the set of classical or Tarski valuations on L. We also define SL
+ as the
sentences of L generated recursively from the propositional variables by application of the
connectives ∧ and ∨ only, and similarly we let SL− denote the sentences of L generated
recursively from the negated propositional variables by application of ∧ and ∨ only. Here
we can think of SL+ as the set of entirely positive sentences and SL− as the set of entirely
negative sentences of L respectively. Note that the class of sentences SL+ ∪ SL−, whilst
restricted, is nonetheless important for applications e.g. data base querying and rule-
based systems. We now introduce a partial ordering on Vc which has some similarity to
the semantic precision ordering on valuation pairs.
Definition 21. Ordering on Vc
For v1, v2 ∈ Vc, v1 E v2 iff ∀p ∈ P, v1(p) = 1⇒ v2(p) = 1.
Theorem 22. For v1, v2 ∈ Vc, if v1 E v2 then;
(i) ∀ψ ∈ SL+, v1(ψ) ≤ v2(ψ).
(ii) ∀ψ ∈ SL−, v2(ψ) ≤ v1(ψ)
Proof. Part (i): We proceed by induction on the complexity of sentences in SL+. Let
SL+,0 = P and SL+,k = SL+,k−1 ∪ {θ ∧ ϕ, θ ∨ ϕ : θ, ϕ ∈ SL+,k−1} for k ≥ 1. Now if
ψ = pi ∈ SL
+,0 = P then v1(pi) ≤ v2(pi) by definition 21. If ψ ∈ SL
+,k then either
ψ ∈ SL+,k−1 in which case the result follows trivially or there exist θ, ϕ ∈ SL+,k−1 and
one of the following holds:
• ψ = θ∧ϕ: In this case v1(ψ) = min(v1(θ), v1(ϕ)) ≤ min(v2(θ), v2(ϕ)) (by induction)
= v2(ψ).
• ψ = θ∨ϕ: In this case v1(ψ) = max(v1(θ), v1(ϕ)) ≤ max(v2(θ), v2(ϕ)) (by induction)
= v2(ψ).
Part (ii): Let SL−,0 = {¬pi : pi ∈ P} and SL
−,k = SL−,k−1∪{θ∧ϕ, θ∨ϕ : θ, ϕ ∈ SL−,k−1}
for k ≥ 1. Now if ψ = ¬pi ∈ SL
−,0 then v2(¬pi) = 1 ⇒ v2(pi) = 0 ⇒ v1(pi) = 0, since
v1 E v2, ⇒ v1(¬pi) = 1 as required. The inductive steps then mirror those of part (i).
Hence, from definition 21 and theorem 22 we see if v1 E v2 then v2 has a greater
tendency than v1 to classify positive sentences as being true, and a lesser tendency to
classify negative sentences as being true. This is in contrast to the semantic precision
ordering on Kleene valuations, where ~v1  ~v2 means that ~v2 has a greater tendency that
~v1 to classify any of the sentences of L as being true.
Definition 23. Given v1, . . . , vm ∈ Vc forming a sequence v1 E v2 E . . . E vm then
∀θ ∈ SL, let lθ = min{i : vi(θ) = 1} and let uθ = max{i : vi(θ) = 1}
Theorem 24. Given v1, . . . , vm ∈ Vc forming a sequence v1 E v2 E . . . E vm then:
(i) ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL+, lθ∧ϕ = max(lθ, lϕ) and lθ∨ϕ = min(lθ, lϕ)
(ii) ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL−, uθ∧ϕ = min(uθ, uϕ) and uθ∨ϕ = max(uθ, uϕ)
Proof. Part (i): By theorem 22 we have that ∀θ ∈ SL+, {i : vi(θ) = 1} = {lθ, . . . ,m} and
hence,
{i : vi(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1} = {i : vi(θ) = 1} ∩ {i : vi(ϕ) = 1} = {lθ, . . . ,m} ∩ {lϕ, . . . ,m}
= {max(lθ, lϕ), . . . ,m} ⇒ lθ∧ϕ = max(lθ, lϕ)
as required.
Similarly,
{i : vi(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1} = {i : vi(θ) = 1} ∪ {i : vi(ϕ) = 1} = {lθ, . . . ,m} ∪ {lϕ, . . . ,m}
= {min(lθ, lϕ), . . . ,m} ⇒ lθ∨ϕ = min(lθ, lϕ)
as required.
Part (ii): By theorem 22 we have that ∀θ ∈ SL−, {i : vi(θ) = 1} = {1, . . . , uθ}. Hence,
{i : vi(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1} = {i : vi(θ) = 1} ∩ {i : vi(ϕ) = 1} = {1, . . . , uθ} ∩ {1, . . . , uϕ}
= {1, . . . ,min(uθ, uϕ)} ⇒ uθ∧ϕ = min(uθ, uϕ)
as required. Also,
{i : vi(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1} = {i : vi(θ) = 1} ∪ {i : vi(ϕ) = 1} = {1, . . . , uθ} ∪ {1, . . . , uϕ}
= {1, . . . ,max(uθ, uϕ)} ⇒ uθ∨ϕ = max(uθ, uϕ)
as required.
Since for classical valuations there are no borderline cases then given a probability
distribution w on Vc, truth degrees are simply defined such that ∀θ ∈ SL;
td(θ) = w({v : v(θ) = 1})
In this case td is just a probability measure on SL.
Theorem 25. Let w be a probability distribution on Vc such that {v : w(v) > 0} =
{v1, . . . , vm} where v1 E v2 E . . . E vm. Then ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL
+(SL−) the following hold:
td(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(td(θ), td(ϕ)) and td(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(td(θ), td(ϕ))
where td(θ) = w({v : v(θ) = 1})
Proof. Consider θ, ϕ ∈ SL+ then by theorem 24 it follows that:
td(θ ∧ ϕ) = w({vi : vi(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1}) =
m∑
r=lθ∧ϕ
w(vr) =
m∑
r=max(lθ,lϕ)
w(vr)
= min(
m∑
r=lθ
w(vr),
m∑
r=lϕ
w(vr)) = min(td(θ), td(ϕ))
as required. Also,
td(θ ∨ ϕ) = w({i : vi(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1}) =
m∑
r=lθ∨ϕ
w(vr) =
m∑
r=min(lθ,lϕ)
w(vr)
= max(
m∑
r=lθ
w(vr),
m∑
r=lϕ
w(vr)) = max(td(θ), td(ϕ))
as required.
Now consider θ, ϕ ∈ SL− the by theorem 24 we have that:
td(θ ∧ ϕ) = w({vi : vi(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1}) =
uθ∧ϕ∑
i=1
w(vr) =
min(uθ,uϕ)∑
i=1
w(vr)
= min(
uθ∑
i=1
w(vr),
uϕ∑
i=1
w(vr)) = min(td(θ), td(ϕ))
as required. Also,
td(θ ∨ ϕ) = w({vi : vi(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1}) =
uθ∨ϕ∑
i=1
w(vr) =
max(uθ,uϕ)∑
i=1
w(vr)
= max(
uθ∑
i=1
w(vr),
uϕ∑
i=1
w(vr)) = max(td(θ), td(ϕ))
as required.
One example where we can find sequences of classical valuations as in theorem 25,
relates to a prototype theory interpretation of categories as introduced in [28]. Suppose
that the propositions P correspond to the formula {Q1(x), . . . , Qn(x)} where {Qi : i =
1, . . . , n} are unary predicates and x is particular example. Furthermore, suppose that the
interpretation of these predicates is as follows: Given an underlying universe Ω on which
is defined a pseudo-distance metric d, then for any element x ∈ Ω, Qi(x) holds if and only
if d(x, ai) ≤ ǫ where ai ∈ Ω is the prototype for Qi and ǫ ∈ R
+ is a distance threshold.
Hence, for a fixed threshold value ǫ this model naturally generates a classical valuation vǫ
on L such that; ∀pi ∈ P
vǫ(pi) = 1 if and only if d(x, ai) ≤ ǫ
In other words, pi is true if and only if x is sufficiently similar to the prototype ai. Hence,
a sequence of increasing thresholds ǫ1 < ǫ2 < . . . < ǫm naturally generates a sequence
of classical valuations on L such that vǫ1 E vǫ2 E . . . E vǫm . One can then envisage a
scenario in which an agent’s uncertainty is only regarding the value of the threshold ǫ. If
they were then to define a probability distribution on ǫ this would result in a corresponding
distribution w on Vc, non-zero only on a sequence of valuations as in theorem 25.
6.2 Truth Degrees and Supervaluation Pairs
Supervaluationism was proposed as a theory of vagueness by Fine [16] (see also Williamson
[54] for an exposition). In this approach it is assumed that vague predicates have different
admissible crisp interpretations, referred to as precisifications. For example, the predicate
short may admit a range of admissible threshold values on height, each defining a different
precisification. The simplest formulation of supervaluationism in a propositional logic
language is in terms of a set of admissible classical valuations. This approach naturally
leads to a valuation pair representation as follows:
Definition 26. Supervaluation Pairs [31]
A supervaluation pair is defined as follows: For Π ⊆ Vc let ∀θ ∈ SL;
v(θ) = min{v(θ) : v ∈ Π} and v(θ) = max{v(θ) : v ∈ Π}
Let Vs denote the set of all supervaluation pairs on L.
11
Lawry and Tang [31] show that supervaluation pairs are characterised by the following
four properties: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL;
• Duality: v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ) and v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ)
• Tautology preservation: If θ is a classical tautology then ~v(θ) = t.
• Equivalence: If θ and ϕ are classically equivalent then ~v(θ) = ~v(ϕ).
• Maximum upper: v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)).
Notice that by duality and tautology preservation any classical contradiction θ ∧ ¬θ is
absolutely false no matter what the truth value of θ. Also, by duality and maximal upper
we have that:
v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ))
In general, however, for supervaluation pairs it only holds that:
v(θ ∨ ϕ) ≥ max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∧ ϕ) ≤ min(v(θ), v(ϕ))
In comparison to the Kleene valuation pair operators (definition 2) this means that super-
valuation pairs have a lesser tendancy to propagate borderline truth values.
We now introduce a particular sub-class of supervaluation pairs on L referred to as
bounded supervaluation pairs.
Definition 27. Bounding Valuations
Let ~v ∈ Vs be a supervaluation pair characterised by the set of admissible classical valua-
tions Π ⊆ Vc. Then let v∗, v
∗ ∈ Vc be classical valuations such that:
∀pi ∈ P, v∗(pi) = min{v(pi) : v ∈ Π} and v
∗(pi) = max{v(pi) : v ∈ Π}
Definition 28. Bounded Supervaluation pairs [31]
~v ∈ Vs is a bounded supervaluation pair if and only if {v∗, v
∗} ⊆ Π. Let Vbs denote the
set of all bounded supervaluation pairs on L.
One way to motivate bounded supervaluation pairs is to consider disjunctions and
conjunctions of the borderline propositions. For ~v ∈ Vs let B denote the set of borderline
propositional variables i.e. B = {pi : ~v(pi) = b}. Now if v∗ 6∈ Π then ~v(
∨
pi∈B
pi) = t
and if v∗ 6∈ Π then ~v(
∧
pi∈B
pi) = f . These would seem to be rather strong properties
11For any supervaluation pair ~v ∈ Vs there is a unique defining set of admissible classical valuations
given by Π = {v ∈ Vc : v(αv) = 1} where αv =
∧
pi:v(pi)=1
pi ∧
∧
pi:v(pi)=0
¬pi.
for borderline cases12. Hence, the restriction to bounded supervaluation pairs means
that for the borderline propositions there will be at least one admissible valuation in
which they are all true, and at least one in which they are all false. This ensures that
~v(
∨
pi∈B
pi) = ~v(
∧
pi∈B
pi) = b.
The following theorem from [31] shows that bounded supervaluation pairs obey all the
Kleene valuation pairs conjunction and disjunction operators when restricted to either
the set of entirely positive sentences SL+ or the set of entirely negative sentences SL−.
This result will be a foundation of the bridge we will build between the supervaluationist
framework and fuzzy logic.
Theorem 29. For ~v ∈ Vbs then ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL
+(SL−) it holds that:
v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
The notion of semantic precision is clearly also relevant in a supervaluationist frame-
work and definition 6 can be naturally extended so as to generate a vagueness ordering,
also denoted , on Vs. In this case it immediately follows that for ~v1, ~v2 ∈ Vs, if ~v1  ~v2
then v1∗ E v2∗ and v
∗
2 E v
∗
1, since by definition 27 it holds that ∀~v ∈ Vs and ∀pi ∈ P,
v∗(pi) = v(pi) and v
∗(pi) = v(pi). Furthermore, we have the following characterisation of
the  ordering on Vs taken from [31].
Theorem 30. [31] For ~v1, ~v2 ∈ Vs, ~v1  ~v2 if and only if Π1 ⊆ Π2.
In the following theorem we now show that, for bounded supervaluation pairs, there
is a close relationship between the lower and upper valuations and the bounding classical
valuations (definition 27) on SL+ and SL−.
Theorem 31. If ~v ∈ Vbs then:
(i) ∀ψ ∈ SL+, v(ψ) = v∗(ψ) and v(ψ) = v
∗(ψ)
(ii) ∀ψ ∈ SL−, v(ψ) = v∗(ψ) and v(ψ) = v∗(ψ)
Proof. Part (i): Proceed by induction on the complexity of sentences. For ψ = pi ∈
SL+,0 = P then by definition 27 v(pi) = min{v(pi) : v ∈ Π} = v∗(pi) and v(pi) =
max{v(pi) : v ∈ Π} = v
∗(pi). If ψ ∈ SL
+,k then either ψ ∈ SL+,k−1 in which case the
result follows trivially or there exists θ, ϕ ∈ SL+,k−1 for which one of the following holds:
• ψ = θ∧ϕ: In this case v(ψ) = v(θ∧ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) by the properties of super-
valuation pairs as outlined above [31] = min(v∗(θ), v∗(ϕ)) by induction = v∗(θ∧ϕ) =
12As an example of an unbounded supervaluation pair assume P = {p1, p2} and let Π = {v1, v2} where
v1(p1 ∧ ¬p2) = 1 and v2(¬p1 ∧ p2) = 1. Then v∗ is such that v∗(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2) = 1 and v
∗ is such that
v∗(p1 ∧ p2) = 1. Clearly in this case {v∗, v
∗} ∩Π = ∅.
v∗(ψ) by the properties of Tarski valuations. Also v(ψ) = v(θ∧ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ))
by theorem 29 = min(v∗(θ), v∗(ϕ)) by induction = v∗(θ ∧ϕ) = v∗(ψ) by the proper-
ties of Tarski valuations.
• ψ = θ ∨ ϕ: In this case v(ψ) = v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) by theorem 29 =
max(v∗(θ), v∗(ϕ)) by induction v∗(θ ∨ ϕ) = v∗(ψ) by the properties of Tarski valua-
tions. Also, v(ψ) = v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) by the properties of supervaluation
pairs as outlined above [31] = max(v ∗ (θ), v∗(ϕ)) by induction = v∗(θ ∨ ϕ) = v∗(ψ)
by the properties of Tarski valuations.
Part (ii): Proceed by induction on the complexity of sentences. For ψ = ¬pi ∈ SL
−,0
then by definition 27 we have that ∀v ∈ Π, v(pi) ≤ v
∗(pi) ⇒ 1 − v(pi) ≥ 1 − v
∗(pi) ⇒
v(¬pi) ≥ v
∗(¬pi). Hence, v
∗(¬pi) = min{v(¬pi) : v ∈ Π} = v(¬pi). Also, ∀v ∈ Π,
∀pi ∈ P, v(pi) ≥ v∗(pi) ⇒ 1 − v(pi) ≤ 1 − v∗(pi) ⇒ v(¬pi) ≤ v∗(¬pi). Hence, v∗(¬pi) =
max{v(¬pi) : v ∈ Π} = v(¬pi). The inductive steps then mirror those of part (i).
If adopting the epistemic approach to uncertainty described in section 3 then a su-
pervaluationist agent would represent her beliefs in terms of a probability distribution on
Vs. Similarly to Kleene belief pairs (definition 8) this naturally results in lower and upper
belief measures on the sentences of L of the form: ∀θ ∈ SL;
µ(θ) = w({~v ∈ Vs : v(θ) = 1}) and µ(θ) = w({~v ∈ Vs : v(θ) = 1})
In this case we refer to (µ, µ) as a supervaluation belief pair or a bounded supervaluation
belief pair if w is non-zero only on Vbs. It is straightforward to show that the lower and
upper measures comprising a supervaluation belief pair are respectively Dempster-Shafer
belief and plausibility measures on SL [44]. To see this notice that (µ, µ) can be rewritten
in Shafer’s well-know mass function notation in the following manner. Let m : 2Vc → [0, 1]
be such that if Π ⊆ Vc is the set of admissible valuations for ~v then m(Π) = w(~v).
Furthermore, if for θ ∈ SL we let Π(θ) = {v ∈ Vc : v(θ) = 1} then it holds that:
µ(θ) =
∑
Π⊆Π(θ)
m(Π) and µ(θ) =
∑
Π∩Π(θ) 6=∅
m(Π)
The idea of linking Dempster-Shafer theory to an underlying truth model dates back
to Jaffray [21], who proposed a betting semantics for belief functions based on, in our
notation, the lower supervaluation v. Jaffray’s associated Dutch book theorem is then a
special case of Paris’s general result [41], and the type of bets proposed are equivalent to
lower bets [31], as described in section 5, but in a supervaluationist rather than a Kleene
setting. The relationship between supervaluationism and Dempster-Shafer theory has also
been noted by Field [15], who defines probability measures over the sentences of a modal
logic language with an operator D denoting ‘determinate’. In this setting the belief value
of a sentence θ corresponds to the probability of Dθ.
In contrast to Kleene belief pairs (theorem 9), supervaluation belief pairs are not in
general additive, and instead the lower measure is super-additive and the upper measure
is sub-additive. In [31], however, bounded supervaluation belief pairs are shown to be
equivalent to Kleene belief pairs when restricted entirely to the sentences in SL+ ∪ SL−.
Furthermore, for sentences outside this class, the bounded supervaluation pairs are more
precise than the corresponding Kleene belief pairs, in that they allocate lower probability
values to borderline cases.
We can now adapt definition 10 in order to introduce truth degrees as corresponding
to the mid-point of supervaluation belief pairs. For truth degrees of this kind generated
from bounded supervaluation belief pairs, there is a close relationship with probability
measures on SL as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 32. Let w be a probability distribution on Vbs then there exists a probability
distribution w′ on Vc with an associated probability measure P on SL given by ∀θ ∈
SL, P (θ) = w′({v ∈ V : v(θ) = 1}), such that ∀θ ∈ SL+ ∪ SL−,
P (θ) = td(θ) =
µ(θ) + µ(θ)
2
where
µ(θ) = w({~v ∈ Vbs : v(θ) = 1}) and µ(θ) = w({~v ∈ Vbs : v(θ) = 1})
Proof. Let {~v ∈ Vbs : w(~v) > 0} = {~v1, . . . , ~vm} and then define w
′ on Vc such that:
∀v ∈ Vc,
w′(v) =
∑
i:vi∗=v
w(~vi)
2
+
∑
i:v∗i=v
w(~vi)
2
Now for θ ∈ SL+ it holds that:
td(θ) =
µ(θ) + µ(θ)
2
=
w({~vi : vi(θ) = 1})
2
+
w({~vi : vi(θ) = 1})
2
=
w({~vi : vi∗(θ) = 1})
2
+
w({~vi : v
∗
i (θ) = 1})
2
by theorem 31
= w′({v : v(θ) = 1}) = P (θ)
Similarly, for θ ∈ SL− it holds that:
td(θ) =
µ(θ) + µ(θ)
2
=
w({~vi : vi(θ) = 1})
2
+
w({~vi : vi(θ) = 1})
2
=
w({~vi : v
∗
i (θ) = 1})
2
+
w({~vi : vi∗(θ) = 1})
2
by theorem 31
= w′({v : v(θ) = 1}) = P (θ)
as required.
Hence, theorem 32 shows that the truth degree generated from a bounded supervalu-
ation belief pair corresponds to a probability measure on SL+ ∪ SL−. Furthermore, we
have the following corollary:
Corollary 33. Let w be a probability distribution on Vbs such that {~v : w(~v) > 0} =
{~v1 . . . , ~vm} where ~v1  . . .  ~vm then the credibility measure defined by
td(θ) =
µ(θ) + µ(θ)
2
satisfies the following: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL+(SL−);
td(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(td(θ), td(ϕ)) and td(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(td(θ), td(ϕ))
Proof. Since ~v1  . . .  ~vk then it follows that:
v1∗ E v2∗ E . . . E vk∗ E v
∗
k E v
∗
k−1 E . . . E v
∗
1
Define w′ on {v1∗, . . . , vk∗, v
∗
k, . . . , v
∗
1} as in the proof of theorem 32 then the result follows
immediately from theorem 25.
Example 34. Consider a language L with propositional variables P = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5}.
We now define the Tarski valuations v(i) ∈ Vc for i = 1, . . . 6 as given in the following
table:
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
v(1) 0 0 0 0 0
v(2) 1 1 0 0 0
v(3) 0 0 1 1 0
v(4) 0 0 0 0 1
v(5) 0 0 1 1 1
v(6) 1 1 1 1 1
Based on these classical valuations, we now define supervaluation pairs ~v1, . . . , ~v4 as char-
acterised by the following sets of admissible valuations:
Π1 = {v
(1), v(2), v(3), v(4), v(5), v(6)}, Π2 = {v
(1), v(3), v(4), v(5)},
Π3 = {v
(1), v(4)}, Π4 = {v
(4)}
In addition, we define a probability distribution on supervaluation pairs such that w(~v1) =
0.5, w(~v2) = 0.3, w(~v3) = 0.1 and w(~v4) = 0.1. Now notice that ~v1, . . . , ~v4 are bounded
supervaluation pairs which have the following bounding classical valuations:
v1∗ = v
(1), v2∗ = v
(1), v3∗ = v
(1), v4∗ = v
(4), v∗4 = v
(4), v∗3 = v
(4), v∗2 = v
(5), v∗1 = v
(6)
Hence, the conditions of theorem 32 are satisfied and we can define the following probability
distribution w′ on Vc:
w′(v(1)) =
w(~v1)
2
+
w(~v2)
2
+
w(~v3)
2
= 0.25 + 0.15 + 0.05 = 0.45
w′(v(4)) =
w(~v4)
2
+
w(~v4)
2
+
w(~v3)
2
= 0.05 + 0.05 + 0.05 = 0.15
w′(v(5)) =
w(~v2)
2
= 0.15, w′(v(6)) =
w(~v1)
2
= 0.25
In this case for ¬p2 ∨ ¬p3 ∈ SL
−, we have that:
P (¬p2 ∨ ¬p3) = w
′(v(1)) + w′(v(4)) + w′(v(5)) = 0.45 + 0.15 + 0.15 = 0.75
Also,
µ(¬p2 ∨ ¬p3) = w(~v2) + w(~v3) + w(~v4) = 0.5 and
µ(¬p2 ∨ ¬p3) = w(~v1) + w(~v2) + w(~v3) + w(~v4) = 1 therefore
td(¬p2 ∨ ¬p3) =
0.5 + 1
2
= 0.75
On the other hand for ¬p1 ∧ p5 6∈ SL
+ ∪ SL−, we have that:
P (¬p1 ∧ p5) = w
′(v(4)) + w′(v(5)) = 0.15 + 0.15 = 0.3
But,
µ(¬p1 ∧ p5) = w(v
(4)) = 0.1 and µ(¬p1 ∧ p5) = w(~v1) + w(~v2) + w(~v3) + w(~v4) = 1
therefore td(¬p1 ∧ p5) =
0.1 + 1
2
= 0.55
In addition, notice that ~v1  ~v2  ~v3  ~v4, and hence the conditions of corollary 33 are
satisfied so that, for example, we have the following:
µ(¬p2) = 0.5, µ(¬p2) = 1⇒ td(¬p2) = 0.75
µ(¬p3) = 0.2, µ(¬p3) = 1⇒ td(¬p3) = 0.6
Hence,
max(td(¬p2), td(¬p3)) = max(0.75, 0.6) = 0.75 = td(¬p2 ∨ ¬p3)
In general, supervaluation belief pairs in which w is non-zero only on a sequence of
increasingly sharp valuations, fall within the scope of possibility theory [9]. More specifi-
cally, in such cases the lower and upper beliefs are, respectively, necessity and possibility
measures on SL. This is clear if we adopt the mass function notation outlined above, since
by theorem 30 the mass will now only be non-zero on a nested sequence of sets of classical
valuations Πm ⊆ Πm−1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Π1, where Πi is the set of admissible valuations for ~vi.
In this case truth degrees are credibility measures as first proposed by Dubois and Prade
[9] and later developed at some length by Liu and Liu [36]. The additional assumption
of boundedness required in theorem 32 and corollary 33 does not seem to be typical in
possibility theory.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have identified clear links between probability theory in a three-value truth
setting and min-max fuzzy logic. The most complete bridge is formed when the underlying
truth model is Kleene’s three-valued logic. In this case fully compositional fuzzy truth
degrees as defined on a finite propositional language, can be completely characterised in
terms of probability distributions of Kleene valuation pairs. In a classical (Tarski) or a
supervaluationist context, the min-max calculus for truth degrees can be recaptured only
on the language fragments SL+ and SL−. Across all of these truth models the min-
max operators result when there is a natural semantic precision ordering on the truth
valuations, and in particular when the only uncertainty is about the relative vagueness or
sharpness of the interpretation of L. The latter, however, is a strong assumption and is
likely not to hold in many of the contexts in which an agent must allocate subjective belief
to sentences involving vague propositions. Indeed, we would go so far as to claim that if
truth degrees are interpreted probabilistically then truth-functionality will only arise as a
result of strong assumptions which are in turn only ever likely to be applicable in relatively
restricted contexts. In order to model more complex scenarios than those consistent with a
fully compositional calculus, there is then a case for the integrated study of vagueness and
uncertainty within a richer and less restrictive representational framework. This would be
a new direction distinct from the formal study of fuzzy logics as truth-functional systems
[19] and which would have a quite different motivation.
A number of authors have highlighted the somewhat confusing relationship between
fuzziness and vagueness. For example, Zadeh [57] is adamant that they are completely dis-
tinct phenomena. Dubois [13] emphasises the differences between gradualness and vague-
ness, where a gradual predicate induces a partial ordering on the underlying conceptual
domain, whilst vagueness is epitomised by explicit borderline cases. In contrast, we adopt
a broader more encompassing view of vagueness as a multifaceted phenomenon and where
vague predicates may exhibit any, or all, of the three main symptoms identified by Keefe
[22]. From this perspective our work has identified a clear bridge between fuzziness and
two aspects of vagueness; namely explicit borderlines and blurry (uncertain) boundaries.
In a nutshell, our proposed semantics identifies fuzziness with subjective probabilities of
vague sentences, so that truth degrees are determined by underlying probabilities of the
three truth values t, f and b as illustrated in figure 3. Furthermore, the valuation pair
framework has provided us with a common notation with which to explore probability in
both a Kleene and a supervaluationist setting; these being two widely proposed approaches
to truth-gaps in the literature on vagueness. As already mentioned above, in both theories
the relationship to min-max fuzzy logic is defined in terms of the semantic precision (or
sharpening) ordering. This ordering relates directly to the explicit borderline aspect of
vagueness, with one valuation being vaguer than another if it permits more borderline
cases.
In general, vagueness is frowned upon in science and engineering, where clarity and
semantic precision are seen as being a fundamental prerequisite to progress. A hypothesis
must be precisely formulated before it can be properly empirically tested. From this
perspective, if subjective probability is seen as being a normative theory of belief for
ideally rational agents, then there is no justification for considering its application to
vague propositions. On the other hand, given it ubiquitousness in natural language one
is stongly inclined to suspect that vagueness must have a positive role to play in complex
multi-agent communication systems. To quote Lipman [34], ”It seems rather far fetched
to conclude that we have simply tolerated a worldwide, several thousand year efficiency
loss”. Recently, Van Deemter [50] has proposed a number of communication tasks in which
vagueness can be useful. These include search, where typicality information embedded
in vague predicates can be exploited in order to reduce search times [51], and future
contingencies, referring to the use of vagueness to mitigate the risk of making promises or
forecasts. Indeed, [31] has proposed a decision model based on Kleene belief pairs which
directly exploits borderline cases so as to reduce assertion risks. In Lawry and Dubois [32]
it is proposed that vagueness has a role to play in allowing agents to reach a consensus
between them, whilst at the same time maintaining some level of internal consistency
within their own beliefs. Furthermore, [32] also proposed several consensus combination
operators for Kleene belief pairs in this context. Another positive role for vagueness, at
least in the guise of semantic uncertainty, is in language learning. In the introduction we
have already outlined a case for the explicit representation of semantic uncertainty given
the empircial nature of language learning. In this context, O’ Connor [38] shows that under
time limited conditions and for high dimensional state spaces, optimal learning methods
incorporate vagueness. Also, in agent based systems, [14] has shown how populations of
agents playing a simple language game can evolve a shared set of vague categories which are
then effective in communications. Overall then there is an emerging, although admittedly
still rather embryonic, case for the utility of vagueness in communications. From this
pragmatic viewpoint it can be perfectly rational for an agent to use vague predicates as a
descriptive and representational tool.
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